"The Bali Blast and Beyond"
By Tapol

On 12th October, 2002, three bombs exploded in Legian, a beach resort on the island of Bali, killing at least 180 people and wounding hundreds. The blast was unprecedented, the worst incident since the Twin Towers tragedy in New York. The three bombs exploded almost simultaneously at Renon (close to the United States consulate), Paddy's Cafe and Sari Club at Kuta beach. Some analysts believe that local terrorist cells working in conjunction with the Al Qaeda international network were responsible but in Indonesia, the focus has been on home-grown groups.

In the last three years Indonesia has experienced more than a hundred terrorist bombings. In the wake of the Bali blast, three men, Amrozy, Imam Samudra and Muklas were arrested; while the arrests appear to be providing leads, they have left many questions unanswered.

No one had foreseen an attack on the tourist island of Bali but in hindsight it is clear that soft targets, hotels and night clubs like Paddy's Cafe and Sari Club in Kuta Beach, which are patronised mainly by white people, have been targets elsewhere. The attack on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya and the killing of three American doctors in Yemen only strengthen this conclusion.

The relentless campaign against global terrorism by the Bush Administration has so far produced meagre results and none of the key suspects has been arrested. The 'war on terror' has made the world far less safe. These days, people everywhere can become targets for terrorist attacks.

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Contrasting Perceptions	p

The many bomb attacks in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto have led to public indifference in Indonesia. Most of the outrages have not been resolved. The terrorist acts are widely seen as an extension of state terrorism, carried out with the co-operation of sections of state intelligence units or special army units.

This is in stark contrast with how things are perceived in the rest of the world. The United States administration is convinced of the presence of an Al Qaeda network in Indonesia. In Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, the authorities have been busy mopping up alleged terrorist networks. While they focus attention on Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI), it is hardly seen as a threat in Indonesia. According to Singapore and Malaysian intelligence reports, JI is Al Qaeda's arm in the region and its ringleaders are mainly Indonesian though no one seems to know whether JI is a highly structured organisation of terror or simply a loose network of cells of like-minded people. While many Indonesians are not convinced about this 'terrorist threat', the United States and the UN have placed it on their lists of terrorist organisations. Gradually an international consensus has emerged, portraying JI in the same light as Al Qaeda and it now seems to be taken for granted that the perpetrators of the Bali blast were Al-Qaeda connected.

But in Indonesia, commentators believe that the suspects are home-grown criminals and are far more cautious about linking these acts with global terrorism.

In Indonesia, Jema'ah Islamiyah has a more generic meaning, being the Arabic term for 'Muslim community'. In the eighties, there was a loose network of Muslim communities in Central Java called usroh (family) with common ideas about moral self-improvement, guidance and self-help leading to a pure Muslim society. Many of their ideas were borrowed from the Egyptian movement Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Another common feature was their defiance of Suharto, who was imposing Pancasila as the state ideology, much to the dismay of many Muslim groups.(1)

At the time, Jema'ah Islamiyah simply meant an umbrella for Muslim groups which were victims of state repression. Many usroh members were tried and given heavy sentences for attending small, home-based religious gatherings, but they did not face charges of terrorism.

However, these days in Southeast Asia, Jema'ah Islamiyah as used by police and intelligence authorities has become synonymous with terrorism. The Singapore government has even issued a white paper on the connections between Al-Qaeda and Jema'ah Islamiyah and several anti-terrorism experts have branded JI as a terrorist organisation.

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Greater Caution in Jakarta	p

The Megawati government's handling of global terrorism has been more cautious. While it has focused on surveillance and monitoring alleged suspects, the governments in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have been engaged in pro-active policies like Washington, smashing up suspected cells and arresting scores of people. Long before the top suspect Abubakar Ba'asyir was arrested in Indonesia, the authorities in Singapore and Malaysia were baying for his arrest and depicting him as the ringleader.

This gap in perception also explains the difference in reporting. The world media tends to link the Bali blast with international terrorist networks, linking JI with Al-Qaeda, while the Indonesian press is more focused on the domestic nature of the plot. The differing approaches has led to conflicts within the armed forces and intelligence bodies. Since 11 September, United States intelligence organisations have been seeking allies around the world against Osama bin Laden. Indonesia's National Intelligence Body, BIN, fell for this line and actively helped Washington. In at least two instances, terrorist suspects were seized from their homes and flown illegally to Egypt and Afghanistan for interrogation. This collaboration between BIN and the CIA angered senior police and military officers.

In the post-Suharto era, administrations have been far more circumspect about rounding up alleged political suspects, leading to complaints in Washington about Jakarta's lack of action. While governments in Malaysia and Singapore have arrested people under their draconian ISA laws, post-Suharto Indonesia has until now shown greater respect for civil rights. Some 70 people have been detained in Malaysia while Singapore is holding 31 persons under terrorist suspicions. The Singapore has issued a white paper on the connections between Jema'ah Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda based on the testimonies of the 31 detained. The conclusions of the paper are quite grim and basically state that the global jihad threat over Southeast Asia is still imminent. The Indonesian National Police Chief General Da'i Bachtiar takes a different position and stated in a seminar held in Singapore that so far the multinational police investigations in the Bali blast events has not unearthed any evidence linking JI and Al-Qaeda.

A presidential decree on terrorism has now been introduced (see separate article) by the Jakarta government and the anti-terrorism law which will replace it, now being rushed through the parliament, may reverse this.

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Growing Anti-United States Sentiments	p

Another feature is growing anti-United States sentiment around the world. Washington's pro-Israel policy and its plans for war against Iraq have provoked a new wave of anti-Americanism, even surpassing anti-US sentiments during the Vietnam war. According to an opinion poll in Indonesia soon after the Bali blast, some 80 per cent of Indonesians believed the CIA was behind the Bali outrage.

During the war on Afghanistan, the United States embassy in Jakarta was the scene of daily protests. One has to go back to the sixties to see such vehement denunciations of United States policies but the protesters were all Muslim groups, a new breed of organisations with a specific political agenda.

There are many reasons why pious Muslims have turned against Washington. In the eighties, the first generation of Indonesian Muslim radicals campaigned against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and saw the Americans as friends but friends have now become enemies.

On a global scale the role of Osama bin Laden has become peripheral, if indeed he is still alive. But the movement of Muslim activists in the present unhealthy global atmosphere is a breeding ground for 'freelance operators' who are not necessarily aligned to Al-Qaeda.

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Anti-Islam policies in Indonesia	p

Since the birth of the Indonesian republic, the attitude of Indonesian governments towards radical Muslim groups has lurched from one extreme to the other, from accommodation to repression. The Muslim groups now in the limelight, in particular in the context of the Bali blast and the present anti-United States wave, are all relatively new. Some are part of an international network. The liberal Muslim scholar Ulil Absar-Abdalla calls it a 'Gerakan Islam baru' (new Muslim movement) as distinct from the 'old' mainstream Muslim organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah which represent at least 80 per cent of Indonesian Muslims. (2)

The radicalisation of Islam has been fuelled by the Soviet and United States wars in Afghanistan and the availability of training facilities in Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan. Members of the new groups do not generally come from the mainstream organisations. Their social background is from the ranks of syncretic Muslims, from abangan communities as distinct from the pious Muslim communities across many parts of Central and East Java. Some of the key suspects of the Bali blast can be described as 'reborn' Muslims. (3)

MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), the Council of Jihad Fighters, is one such organisation, a loose umbrella set up in 2000 by Muslim clerics with strong anti-Suharto credentials. MMI's paramilitary wing, Laskar Mujahidin, is active in Maluku. Its most prominent preacher is Abubakar Ba'asyir who runs a small school in Ngruki, in Solo, Central Java called Pesantren al Mukmin. He is also seen at home and abroad as the spiritual leader of Jema'ah Islamiyah. He openly supports the views of Osama bin Laden which makes him an obvious target of the world's press. Ba'asyir was hounded during the anti-Muslim witch-hunt in the eighties and fled to Malaysia for 14 years until the fall of Suharto. MMI campaigns for the introduction of Syariah law not just in Indonesia but throughout the region. It has no clear organisational structure and no registered membership but is supported by the pupils who attend its religious schools.

Another group with an international dimension is Hizbut Tahrir, a spin-off from Ichwanul Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood movement, known for its radicalism in Egypt and Sudan. Like MMI, HT promotes pan-Islamism, and advocates a purity of Islam. HT spokesperson Mohammad Ismail Yusanto is virulently anti-United States of America and frequently quotes from Noam Chomsky on anti-United States policies. It promotes the introduction of Syariah law and promotes a kind of Pan-Islamism, denouncing national borders. (4)

Several leaders of these new groups were prominent Muslim leaders in the late seventies and eighties, when the Suharto regime persecuted radical Muslim groups. (5)

MMI in particular harbours many ex political prisoners of the eighties while HT only emerged into the open in the post-Suharto era. It is difficult to assess the support for these groups. In the 1999 general election, the Muslim vote went mostly to mainstream Muslim parties and to Golkar, the ruling party under Suharto. Some voters supported new Muslim parties, in particular Partai Keadilan (PK), a party with a clear structure and programme. But it should not be lumped together with the Muslim groups mentioned above which function outside the national democratic framework. PK enjoys solid support in many campuses and is likely to gain votes in 2004 while remaining relatively small.

Campaigning for Syariah law by the new Muslim groups is not likely to affect the results of the elections, though it is gaining in popularity in West Java, Madura and South Sulawesi.

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Infiltration by the Army	p

As in some other Muslim countries, Indonesia has developed the tradition of a secular administration. Somewhat like Turkey, the Indonesian armed forces developed a secular, anti-Muslim tradition. In the early years of the republic, the Indonesian army frequently fought against rebel groups wanting to establish a Muslim state. Already in those days, military intelligence developed a habit of infiltrating Muslim groups and inciting them to get involved in dangerous activities, which were then crushed. Top army intelligence officers like Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani became notorious for such intelligence operations, resulting in brutality towards Muslim radicals.

This tradition of financing, fostering and infiltration continues to this day, especially in the two best known militia groups, Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (FPI). Against this background, it is not difficult to conclude that there are connections between the Bali blast perpetrators and hardline military and/or intelligence officers.

Indonesianist Ben Anderson, retired professor from Cornell University, believes that the masterminds of the Bali outrage may be from a military faction that used to control East Timor. They would also be the ones to benefit from restoring the army's central role in Indonesian politics. 'It (Bali bombing) is not an international conspiracy by al-Qaeda but is to do with domestic politics, especially this military group which has a long experience in black operations', he said. 'Terrorists in the case of Indonesia can be found within the state apparatus'. (6) Many political analysts in Indonesia also think along these lines.

The Bali blast on 12 October accelerated measures by the authorities. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who has been taken ill, was removed from hospital the day after the blast and taken into custody. Within a week the Megawati cabinet approved a new anti-terrorist decree giving greater leeway to arrest suspects and an enhanced role for military intelligence .

The authorities had already started clamping down on radical Muslim groups prior to the Bali blast, targeting in particular Laskar Jihad and FPI. Although the leaders of these organisations had strong ties with some highly-placed army and police officers, their military backers suddenly decided to pull the plug. Jafar Umar Thalib (Laskar Jihad) and Habib Rizieq (FPI) were both arrested just prior to the Bali blast.

This is believed to have been prompted by a decision of the TNI Commander-in-Chief General Endriartono Sutarto to summon 'rogue' elements in the army, threatening to take harsh action if they continued to support these organisations. As a result Laskar Jihad announced its dissolution a few days before the Bali blast and the FPI froze its activities shortly after the blast. The two organisations crumbled within days.

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The Recent Bombings	p

Most recent blasts have been politically motivated. The blasts during the short presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), who was trying to curb the political muscle of the army, were widely regarded as being aimed at undermining his presidency.

An analysis by Kontras, a leading human rights organisation, concluded that none of the investigations or trials have been satisfactory as none looked at the motivation and none of the masterminds have been caught.

From 1976 till 1997, with Suharto in power, there were hardly any terrorist attacks but from 1998, when he was forced to step down, the attacks increased dramatically. In 1998 and 1999 13 attacks occurred, in 2000 there were 32, and from January till July 2001, there were 81, not including bombing incidents in conflict areas like Aceh, West Papua, Maluku and Poso. Some of the perpetrators have been identified, arrested and tried but the evidence has been far from convincing. There was plenty of evidence about the use of military equipment but military involvement has not been investigated. Many recent incidents prior to the Bali blast showed signs of greater professionalism as well as indications that the perpetrators were linked to the Bali tragedy.

On 1st August 2000, a huge blast shook the residence of the Philippines ambassador in Jakarta. The 20kg TNT bomb had been planted in a red Suzuki van parked close to the residence and caused huge material damage. Buildings and homes and more than two dozen cars within a radius of 300 metres were badly destroyed. Three bystanders were killed and 22 seriously wounded, including the ambassador who has been crippled for life. A group called Mujahidin Khandag claimed responsibility but nothing is known about it. During the interrogation of Bali suspects, connections were made between the two incidents.

On 13th September 2000, the high-rise building where the Jakarta Stock Exchange is located was badly damaged by a huge bomb which exploded in the car park; Fifteen people were killed and 34 seriously wounded. The attack was very professional; the choice of target ensured maximum publicity and it was timed to hit when transactions at the stock exchange were at their busiest. The RDX explosive used is known to be used by the military. A number of men have been convicted, including three NCOs from the army's elite corps: Corporal Ibrahim Hasan from Kostrad and Sergeant Irwan Ibrahim from Kopassus were given life sentences, but Sergeant Ibrahim Abdul Manaf Wahab escaped from prison in February 2001 and is still at large. Two civilians were given 20-year sentences. The trials failed to reveal anything about the masterminds.

On Christmas Eve 2000, a series of explosions occurred almost simultaneously in 38 places; mostly churches in Jakarta, Bandung, Mojokerto, Medan, Batam, Pakanbaru, Sukabumi, Mataram and Pematang Siantar. Nineteen people were killed and 120 were seriously wounded. The Christmas attacks were clearly the work of a professional group. Most of the bombs contained TNT though some were home-made bombs using a mixture of chemicals. Military involvement is widely suspected because of the meticulous planning of an operation in many parts of the country. In Medan and Bandung connections were traced back to senior military officers but the investigation was shelved.

There have been few arrests and convictions. But links are being made following the Bali arrests. One suspect who has been eager to talk is Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, who is being held in Singapore. He made many allegations about the involvement of Jema'ah Islamiyah in the church bombings giving names of people being held in Indonesia. Bafana also mentioned Imam Samudra as being connected with the blast at the Atrium shopping centre in Jakarta on 1st August 2001. His confessions may not carry much weight however as he is detained under ISA, had no access to a lawyer and probably made his confessions under duress. ISA detainees can be held indefinitely without trial. He incriminated Abubakar Ba'asyir, alleging that he took part in meetings in Solo at which forthcoming terrorist actions were discussed.

One name frequently mentioned is Hambali who is now Indonesia's most wanted man in connection with the Bali blast. Intelligence circles suspect that he has left the country and is hiding in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

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International or Home-Grown?	p

Since the arrest of Amrozi, Imam Samudra aka Abdul Aziz and Muchlas aka Ali Gufron, journalists have tried to piece together information from police reports. They suggest that a complex network of persons and cells was involved in preparing and carrying out the Legian bomb attack.

At least nine groups have been mentioned as being involved: the Serang Group (13 people), the Abdul Rauf group (4 people) and the Sukoharjo group (2 people) involved in the preparations: lodging, finances and survey. The Lamongan group (11 people) and the Bali group (4 people) were directly involved in the blast. The Solo group (9 persons) handled the aftermath, finding hiding places and so on. Groups in Riau and Menado were indirectly involved in the preparations.

But the 'big fish' are said to be Imam Samudra and Muchlas. According to claims in the international press quoting from intelligence circles, Muchlas is alleged to be operational chief for the regional Jema'ah Islamiyah, replacing Hambali aka Riduan Isamuddin. Muchlas is also wanted in Singapore for his alleged role in a plot to blow up the United States embassy in Singapore.

The 'war against terrorism' has prompted the authorities to trample upon civil rights. The radical preacher Abubakar Ba'asyir is widely spoken of as the spiritual leader of Jema'ah Islamiyah and his contacts and pupils are alleged to be involved in the Al-Qaeda terrorist network.

Testimony by 'key witnesses' said to provide irrefutable proof of terrorist connections has turned out to be very contentious. Confessions by Omar al-Faruq, an alleged Al-Qaeda, operative were reported in Time magazine. This man was kidnapped by the Indonesian intelligence agency BIN in June 2002 and handed over to the CIA in violation of correct procedures. According to his so-called confession under interrogation in Afghanistan, he admitted to being involved in several bombing incidents in Indonesia in 1999 and 2000 and in a plot to assassinate President Megawati. He mentioned many names, including Abubakar Ba'asyir, whom he described as being part of a terrorist ring.

In January 2002, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, was arrested in the Philippines, caught red handed with a huge quantity of chemicals. As a former pupil of Abubakar Ba'asyir, he spoke about his involvement in several bombing acts, mostly in the Philippines.

Two papers published by the Jakarta chapter of the International Crisis Group, headed by Sidney Jones focus on the domestic and international connections of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia and Jema'ah Islamiyah. Although the papers appear to be well researched and go into great detail about the organisational and personal connections between radical figures and groups in the Indonesian Muslim world, they fail to draw a distinction between radical right-wing exponents and organised terrorists groups. Some of the information, presented in the studies as facts, is less than convincing and would not stand scrutiny in a court of law. (7)

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Confusion About Confessions	p

Less than three weeks after the blast, the Indonesians already appeared with their first suspect. It did not take long before the three key suspects, Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Muchlas admitted their role in the Bali bombing. In a sensational public appearance, Police Chief General Da'i Bachtiar appeared with Amrozi in front of TV cameras and radio reporters. The aim of the exercise was clear, to convince a sceptical world that police investigations have produced swift results. In January two other key suspects were arrested in Kalimantan: Ali Imron and Mubarak, bringing up to 17 the people who have been arrested in connection with the Bali blast.

Amrozi will be the first one to appear in court. The police forwarded 1600-page dossier to the prosecutors in mid January and it is expected that his trial will start in February, provided that the prosecutors do not find fault with the police dossier.

Initially, people were impressed by the swift results and the seeming professionalism of the police officers, assisted by colleagues from Australia, the United States, the UK and Japan. But gradually, fundamental flaws have begun to emerge.

The first relates to the material used for the bombs and the remnants of the Mitsubishi van, containing the bomb which was allegedly driven to the site by Amrozi. The huge crater, five-foot deep and twenty-foot wide indicates that the van would have been completely vaporised. In turns out the engine block was still intact and the police investigators were able to trace the owner of the van from reading the van chassis number. This is what led to Amrozi's arrest. In his testimony Amrozi admitted carrying a huge amount of chemicals in his van to the site. In a later finding, the police traced 1 ton of explosives, owned by Amrozi, in Lamongan, creating confusion over whether the bomb had indeed been inside the van.

Robert Finnegan, an investigative journalist and editor of Jakarta Post raises a key question:

'Day after day investigators trotted out a different explosives and combinations of explosives purportedly responsible for the blasts. In addition to C-4 and RDX there was now TNT, Ammonium Nitrate, HMX, Semtex, PETN, Chlorate and Napalm. Everything but the kitchen sink. Was this gross ineptitude? Or another ploy to throw independent investigators off the trail?' (8)

Things became even more confused when the key suspect, Imam Samudra, who claimed that he was behind the idea of the Bali blast, is now giving a very different version. According to this version, Iqbal, who supposedly died in the event, was a suicide bomber who carried one kg of TNT and exploded the bomb inside the café. Imam Samudra claims that he drove Iqbal to the site by motorbike. He says he was shocked by the scale of the blast. (9)

Well he might be, for such an amount of explosives could not have caused such a blast.

The testimonies regarding the preparation of the Bali blast also don't add up. According to the police the different groups met twice in Solo in different locations. In one of the locations the police found interesting documents about the organisational structure and strategy of Jema'ah Islamiyah, which is said to the first hard evidence about the existence of JI.

As the story unravels, the evidence becomes ever more curious, but what is missing is any evidence of the military's role. As long as a tight veil of secrecy hides this part of the story, the real truth about the Bali outrage will remain hidden.

Bali Fire Ball -October 2002

(1) See Martin van Bruinessen, The Violent Fringes of Indonesia's Islam, ISIM Newsletter 11/02, December 2002
(2) Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, 'Fatwa itu Lemah, tapi Mengkhawatirkan', Tempo, 22 December 2002
(3) United States-Indonesia Society, Impact of the Bali Bombings, Conference Report November 26, 2002
(4) Mohammad Ismail Yusanto, Terror Islam, Terror Global, Makalah di HI, 14 November 2002
(5) See also Indonesia: Muslims on Trail, TAPOL, 1987, and Islam Diadili: Mengungkap Tragedi Tanjung Priok, Teplok Press 2002
(6) Supalak Ganjanakhunkee, Bali Attack Result of Internal Politics, The Nation, Asia News Network in Jakarta Post 27 December 2002
(7) ICG, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia, Jakarta, August 2002 and ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jema'ah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, Jakarta, December 2002
(8) See also Robert S. Finnegan, Bali bombing: An Investigator's analysis, The Jakarta Post, 3 January 2003
(9) Tempo, 22 December 2002

Tapol, Bulletin Online 169-170 - Jan/Feb 2003

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