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Chapter
Eight- Encounters with the Ba’th Party: The Final Episode
The
leaders of the Ba’th regime thought that their measures in 1977 had put
an end to religious opposition for years to come, but the revolution in
Iran in 1978 rekindled efforts against the Shah and a revolution led by
religious leaders in Najaf was in the making. The Shi’a capital was
again at centre stage; though this time the effort was not directed toward
the Ba’th, it was still troublesome to the Iraqi regime. Ayatullah
Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian uprising, had been living in Najaf for
the past fourteen years. He took advantage of Ba’th enmity toward the
Shah to launch a campaign against him in Iran. He was given access to
Iraqi radio to beam his messages, and this also made it possible for him
to be approached by his political collaborators. However, such favours
(which in any case were severed after the Saddam-Shah Algiers agreement in
1975 that ended the hostility between the two regimes) did not elicit any
pro-Ba’th sentiment from Khomeini. He had witnessed the Ba’th’s
oppressive measures toward the Hawza of Najaf and toward Shi’a leaders.
The
revolution in Iran seemed to demonstrate that an oppressive regime run by
a well entrenched security apparatus and supported by the Western
intelligence could in fact be challenged and defeated, and that Islamic
ideology was capable of leading the masses to establish the dreamed-of
Islamic state. It showed that blood sacrificed during revolution can
encourage other devotees of Islam’s cause. The oppressive measures of
the regime could be turned into the means for achieving victory. The
revolution in Iran presented an appealing political scenario for Muslim
revolutionaries to follow; the Iraqi Shi’a were the first to emulate it.
Sadr
made several calculated but discreet political moves that would not
antagonize the Iraqi regime but would show his commitment to and support
for the revolution in Iran.(50) He
first sent a long statement to the Iranian people while Khomeini was in
Paris, declaring his support and praising the uprising.
(51) Then
after Khomeini returned to Iran, Sadr sent Mahmood al-Hashimi, one of his
closest disciples, to Iran as his representative.
(52) Both actions were considered by the Iraqi regime as
clear violations of the government’s "wait and see" policy.
(53)
Furthermore,
Sadr, contrary to the Ba’th government policy of instigating and
supporting the uprising of the Arab population in Iran, had asked the
Arabs to support the Islamic state that eventually would fulfil their
political and ethnic rights. In one of his messages to the Iranian people,
Sadr called on the Arabs in Iran to obey the leaders of the revolution
because the Islamic republic represented the state founded by the Prophet
where people of different nationalities and ethnic background could live
in tranquillity. (54)
Sadr
then published six essays that concerning the foundation of the Islamic
state which were later collected under the title al-Islam Yaqwud al-Hayat
(Islam governs life). One of them dealt with the religious basis for
forming an Islamic government. In this treatise he outlined the structure
of an Islamic state, the functions of each of its branches of government,
the responsibilities of the marja’
in the state, and the legitimacy of his absolute authority
according to Shi’a Islam. The treatise seems to have had a major impact
on the authors of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One
can find many of Sadr’s ideas and views on the structure of an Islamic
state in the final draft of that document. The other five essays dealt
with the principles of the Islamic state and the structure of its economy,
using ideas similar to those Sadr presented in his works twenty years
earlier, proof that he had conformed to his early ijtihad.
Sadr
Issues Fatwa Against The Ba'th Party
Sadr’s
boldest step against the regime was issuing a fatwa prohibiting Muslims
from joining the Ba’th party or its affiliated organizations, a step so
dangerous that even some of Sadr’s representatives in various Iraqi
cities hesitated to publish it because they feared for their own safety
and for Sadr’s survival. To make its contents known, Sadr resorted to
means such as encouraging his students to ask him questions during his
regular sermons in the Hawza regarding participation in the Ba’th
party. After that people expected a severe step to be taken against Sadr,
but relations between Sadr and the regime remained under control. Instead,
the last straw was added by Iran.
Ayatullah
Khomeini, relying on his sources in Najaf, broadcast a message to Sadr
calling on him to stay in the Hawza and not to leave Iraq despite
government harassment. (55) Although
Sadr was facing detainment or possibly execution, he was not in any case
planning to leave Iraq. (56) Khomeini’s message and Sadr’s response,
(57) which were heard by millions in Iraq, set off a wave
of public demonstrations in several Iraqi cities in support of Sadr and in
praise of Khomeini. Najaf was the most turbulent; there delegations from
all over Iraq came to hold demonstrations and to be received by Sadr. Sadr
told his followers to call the demonstrations off; since they represented
the core of his support, Sadr did not want them exposed to the regime and
needed to secure their protection from future government crackdowns.
(58) He told one of the Da’wa’s members that "the
regime’s quiescence for the moment reveals a great hidden danger; thus
we should use precautions and prudence in our action."
(59)
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