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Bismillar ir Rahman ir Raheem

The Role Of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr In Shi'a Political Activism  In Iraq From 1958 TO 1980  

Chapter Eight- Encounters with the Ba’th Party: The Final Episode

The leaders of the Ba’th regime thought that their measures in 1977 had put an end to religious opposition for years to come, but the revolution in Iran in 1978 rekindled efforts against the Shah and a revolution led by religious leaders in Najaf was in the making. The Shi’a capital was again at centre stage; though this time the effort was not directed toward the Ba’th, it was still troublesome to the Iraqi regime. Ayatullah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian uprising, had been living in Najaf for the past fourteen years. He took advantage of Ba’th enmity toward the Shah to launch a campaign against him in Iran. He was given access to Iraqi radio to beam his messages, and this also made it possible for him to be approached by his political collaborators. However, such favours (which in any case were severed after the Saddam-Shah Algiers agreement in 1975 that ended the hostility between the two regimes) did not elicit any pro-Ba’th sentiment from Khomeini. He had witnessed the Ba’th’s oppressive measures toward the Hawza of Najaf and toward Shi’a leaders.

The revolution in Iran seemed to demonstrate that an oppressive regime run by a well entrenched security apparatus and supported by the Western intelligence could in fact be challenged and defeated, and that Islamic ideology was capable of leading the masses to establish the dreamed-of Islamic state. It showed that blood sacrificed during revolution can encourage other devotees of Islam’s cause. The oppressive measures of the regime could be turned into the means for achieving victory. The revolution in Iran presented an appealing political scenario for Muslim revolutionaries to follow; the Iraqi Shi’a were the first to emulate it.

Sadr made several calculated but discreet political moves that would not antagonize the Iraqi regime but would show his commitment to and support for the revolution in Iran.(50)  He first sent a long statement to the Iranian people while Khomeini was in Paris, declaring his support and praising the uprising. (51)  Then after Khomeini returned to Iran, Sadr sent Mahmood al-Hashimi, one of his closest disciples, to Iran as his representative. (52) Both actions were considered by the Iraqi regime as clear violations of the government’s "wait and see" policy. (53)  

Furthermore, Sadr, contrary to the Ba’th government policy of instigating and supporting the uprising of the Arab population in Iran, had asked the Arabs to support the Islamic state that eventually would fulfil their political and ethnic rights. In one of his messages to the Iranian people, Sadr called on the Arabs in Iran to obey the leaders of the revolution because the Islamic republic represented the state founded by the Prophet where people of different nationalities and ethnic background could live in tranquillity. (54)  

Sadr then published six essays that concerning the foundation of the Islamic state which were later collected under the title al-Islam Yaqwud al-Hayat (Islam governs life). One of them dealt with the religious basis for forming an Islamic government. In this treatise he outlined the structure of an Islamic state, the functions of each of its branches of government, the responsibilities of the marja’  in the state, and the legitimacy of his absolute authority according to Shi’a Islam. The treatise seems to have had a major impact on the authors of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One can find many of Sadr’s ideas and views on the structure of an Islamic state in the final draft of that document. The other five essays dealt with the principles of the Islamic state and the structure of its economy, using ideas similar to those Sadr presented in his works twenty years earlier, proof that he had conformed to his early ijtihad.

Sadr Issues Fatwa Against The Ba'th Party

Sadr’s boldest step against the regime was issuing a fatwa prohibiting Muslims from joining the Ba’th party or its affiliated organizations, a step so dangerous that even some of Sadr’s representatives in various Iraqi cities hesitated to publish it because they feared for their own safety and for Sadr’s survival. To make its contents known, Sadr resorted to means such as encouraging his students to ask him questions during his regular sermons in the Hawza regarding participation in the Ba’th party. After that people expected a severe step to be taken against Sadr, but relations between Sadr and the regime remained under control. Instead, the last straw was added by Iran.

Ayatullah Khomeini, relying on his sources in Najaf, broadcast a message to Sadr calling on him to stay in the Hawza and not to leave Iraq despite government harassment. (55)  Although Sadr was facing detainment or possibly execution, he was not in any case planning to leave Iraq. (56)  Khomeini’s message and Sadr’s response, (57) which were heard by millions in Iraq, set off a wave of public demonstrations in several Iraqi cities in support of Sadr and in praise of Khomeini. Najaf was the most turbulent; there delegations from all over Iraq came to hold demonstrations and to be received by Sadr. Sadr told his followers to call the demonstrations off; since they represented the core of his support, Sadr did not want them exposed to the regime and needed to secure their protection from future government crackdowns. (58) He told one of the Da’wa’s members that "the regime’s quiescence for the moment reveals a great hidden danger; thus we should use precautions and prudence in our action." (59)

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