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The constitution of Pakistan
is being re-engineered again. Well, one must not be surprised or cry
about this activity, as this has been a trend in the ruling system
of Pakistan since the first peace of document "Objectives Resolution"
was produced on
March 12, 1949. Though the ‘causes’ and the ‘needs of the time’ are given
whenever this poor document is altered but the fact of the matter
remains the same that every ruler has used the constitution to
control the situation in their favour and remain in power.
To understand the shortcomings in the governance and the
democracy in Pakistan, one must find explanations for the weaknesses in political
tolerance and identity. Analytically, there appear to be sets of
reasonably autonomous and enduring beliefs and values within Pakistan
that have important consequences in the societal and ultimately
political spheres. Popular expectations of authority, in particular
toward those who govern, must be understood and presumably altered
if
Pakistan
is to realize the kind of system that permits a sustainable
democracy. Legal provisions and better people seeking public office
are important, but progress in building civic virtue or civic spirit
will also have to occur. In the absence of such a culture, factional
anarchy and authoritarian rule remain thrive.
Historically, the political culture
in Pakistan
is a strong product of its past that links to the pre-partition
British Rule. What Pakistan's leaders knew best from this inheritance was the so-called
viceregal system that made little or no provision for popular
awareness or involvement. The system was designed to rule over a
subjected population and intended to keep order and collect taxes.
In fact, what the British bequeathed was often a contradiction
between theories of governance and their practices. Ideals of
representative government and equality before the law were
incomplete transformations. The territorial issues and border
conflicts with India, the socio-cultural differences within the
country, struggle for a share of power between the states and the
early death of the founder of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah are those
realities which not only politicised the policy-making elites and
their willingness in introducing the fair democratic procedures but
also encouraged the non-democratic elements including the army.
Consequently, even after half a century the country could not get
cleaned from the feudal, tribal and punchayat systems and sectarian
segregations and the public has been left untutored in the kind of
vigilance usually needed to hold political leaders accountable.
Pakistan
was without a formal, written constitution until 1956. The
democratic myths that so often sustain a system were thus only
weakly instilled, and precedents were created that undermined those
few parliamentary and democratic norms that could be drawn upon. It
did not help that in the early years non-party prime ministers were
appointed by the head of state rather than by those who had to
appeal to an electorate. Mass involvement in politics, if defined by
rallies and periodic opportunities to vote, certainly increased over
the years. Street demonstrations helped to bring down governments,
namely Ayub's in 1968, Yahya Khan's in 1971, and Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto's in 1977. Yet while these actions strengthen feelings of
efficacy, none can be easily equated with democratic processes.
The weakness of democratic practices
in Pakistan
can be explained in many ways. Some observers stress constitutional
and electoral provisions among institutional factors said to have
undermined responsible and responsive government. Others point to
the quality of Pakistan's leadership over most of Pakistan’s history, namely, that
Pakistan has been let down by unprincipled political figures motivated by raw
ambition, material gain and vested interests.
The subsequent education of people to
accept democracy through meaningful participation in their political
affairs is minimal. Without wide public awareness and an effective
public opinion, the political system gives wide berth to ambitious
and corrupts political leaders. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the
two times democratically elected prime ministers, are the perfect
examples of the corruptions at the leadership level. Instead of
including a broad citizenry in the political process, power is
concentrated in the hands of an elitist bureaucracy and
over-ambitious military. The country's semi-feudal system with its
sets of obligations and hierarchy provided similarly inhospitable
soil for building a democracy. The traditional power brokers, the
wealthy, large land-holding families, are prepared to give their
allegiance to anyone who promised to protect their material
interests and way of life.
The civilian government succumbed to
military rule that sought to legitimise itself with the public by
attacks on democratic ideals and political institutions in hopes of
leaving them in disrepute as well as decay. Despite the revival of
democracy from time to time, it is predictably held in suspicion.
One of the tenets of civil society, the concept of a legitimate
opposition, naturally won little acceptance among competing
political elites or within the larger public. These outpourings
marked a breakdown in law and order, and reflected above all an
absence of trust in authority. Such anomic movements may have
heralded demands for better representation but in themselves were
more the signs of frustration and anger than of belief in a more
pluralistic, tolerant political system.
The election of 1970, the first to be
held on the basis of universal suffrage, appeared to be a watershed
for democracy. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto -who was the creation of a
military ruler, Ayub Khan - provided the strongest hope for a
politics that would involve the masses and socialize them to
democratic and socialist ideals. The mass mobilization of the
electorate by his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) succeeded in
communicating with many rural voters. People listened to Ms Bhutto and
other political leaders not only at rallies but over radio and
television. The issues of the day were articulated forcefully and
clearly, such that voters had meaningful choices to make. And these
masses demonstrated that they could throw off, if it really served
their interests - the feudal assumptions that usually shaped their
attitudes and actions. Yet rather than build up his popular movement
on the democratic ideals of supremacy of the people, in power Bhutto
shed much of the regime's populist ideology and strongly
personalized his rule rather than working through participatory
institutions and educating the public to their value. By his 1977
re-election campaign, he had come to rely on feudals and discarded
many of the political allies who had stood with him earlier. Above
all, Ms Bhutto had failed to deliver the fair governance and a true
democracy. While he had opened up for the future the possibility of
more participatory politics, the civic virtues that would be needed
to buttress it were in the end discredited.
Pakistan
could indeed become a crucible for determining whether extensions of
democratic practice are likely to provide a successful means of
accommodating militant Islamic political movements. The country's
experiences suggest that militant Islamic parties may be moderated
when given a democratic option - an honest opportunity to compete.
The popularity of Islamic parties in many cities and towns,
according to this reasoning, is largely of a protest variety, coming
from the denial of a more open political process. However, many
analysts also seriously question the compatibility of Islamic
doctrines with more liberal conceptions of democracy. Very likely
the best reason to insist on the appropriateness of democratic
values and institutions is that, from an ideological-constitutional
standpoint, democracy does not represent an alien goal.
Pakistan
was founded on many of these precepts, and as ideals they continue
to resonate widely. Such basic ideas as representative government
and rule of law remain part of the Pakistani society's aspirations
for itself. To be sure, there has been a rejection at the emotional
level of some aspects of western culture and disgust with secular
political institutions. Replacement with authentic Islamic
institutions is the widely accepted ultimate objective. The kind of
civil society and underlying culture appropriate for Pakistan
should not be expected to mimic western experiences. Any democracy
in Pakistan
will have to take into account certain Islamic prescriptions and
other legacies. Experiencing and mixing western democratic system
with Islamic laws will continue to create more loopholes in the
ruling mechanism.
In general, opportunities for a fair
governance, true democracy and civil society in Pakistan
can only flourish when democratic practices are allowed to prevail
under the supremacy of unchanged constitution. The repeated
dismissal or overthrow of elected regimes, alterations in the
constitutions that suit to existing ruler, leaves no positive memory
and little chance for institutions to adapt and supportive values to
root.
Though the elections sometime are
tainted by design or overzealous officials, the regular elections
will ultimately provide democratic practices to the contestants in
which losers accept defeat and winners are magnanimous in victory,
the greater the chances for an electoral process capable of
surviving inevitable challenges. The inefficient and incapable
politicians may continue to participate and seek power but the
people of
Pakistan
will also learn and understand better the democratic values and
responsibilities over the period.
Syed Atiq ul Hassan
, Opinion Writer/Political Analyst,
Phone: 61-2-9707 1535, Fax: 61-2-9709
4867,
P.O. Box: A1113, Sydney South NSW Australia.
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